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MARKETS ANALYSIS
Abstract: This paper introduces a new market analysis methodology based on maximum
likelihood estimation of a mixture distribution model incorporating price, transfer
cost, and trade flow data.  Not only does this method obviate statistical problems
associated with conventional price analysis methods, it also permits differentiation
between market integration and competitive market equilibrium.  The model generates
estimates of the frequency of alternative regimes, combinations of which provide
useful, intuitive measures of intermarket tradability, competitive market equilibrium,
perfect integration, segmented equilibrium, and segmented disequilibrium.  An
application to trade in soybean meal among Pacific Rim economies demonstrates the
usefulness of the method. 
Keywords: international trade, law of one price, market integration, spatial equilibrium1
Spatial market relationships can be described by either prices or quantities.  Many economists
establish the appropriate aggregation of spatial units by reference to trade volumes.  Declarations
about global economic integration likewise rest largely on observations about increasing cross-border
flows.  These quantity based measures of tradability are one important class of indicator of market
integration. Other economists employ price data to assess the comovement among prices from
spatially distinct markets.  Ubquitous tests of the absolute or relative versions of the law of one price
and of intermarket price convergence are prime examples of this second class of price-based
indicators of market integration.  
Yet both classes of indicators have important shortcomings.  Integration analysis based on
trade volumes typically cannot establish whether equilibrium arbitrage conditions hold, and thus
whether trade is socially efficient.  Meanwhile, prevailing price analysis methods – e.g., correlation
coefficients,  Granger causality, cointegration, error correction – tell us little or nothing about actual
trading behavior.  Moreover, price analysis techniques are unreliable under a variety of conditions,
including when trade is discontinuous or bidirectional, and when transactions costs are nonstationary
(Dahlgran and Blank 1992, Barrett 1996, Baulch 1997, McNew and Fackler 1997, Fackler and
Goodwin forthcoming).  Unfortunately, such conditions are common.  
As a step toward advancing the inferential capacity of market integration testing methods, we
introduce a new methodology based on maximum likelihood estimation of a mixture distribution
model incorporating price, transfer cost, and trade flow data.  This new method permits distinction
between market integration, reflecting the tradability of products between spatially distinct markets,
irrespective of the existence or absence of spatial market equilibrium, and competitive market
equilibrium, in which extraordinary profits are exhausted by competitive pressures to yield socially2
efficient allocations, regardless of whether this results in physical trade flows between markets.  These
two concepts are conflated in traditional market analysis methods.  
The paper is structured as follows.  First we review the conceptual foundation of our
approach, the crucial assumptions of existing market integration testing methods, and the mechanics
of the technique this paper introduces.  We then describe a new set of monthly soybean meal price,
trade flow, and transfer cost time series we constructed for Canada, Japan, Taiwan, and the United
States.  This parsimonious data set includes bidirectional and discontinuous trade flows, and
nonstationary price and transfer cost series, the very characteristics that bedevil existing price analysis
methods.  We then show that in these data, the new method yields conclusions that differ markedly
from those generated by conventional market analysis methods.  The resulting insights are helpful,
for example, in enhancing analysts’ ability to identify either  potential strategic trading behavior or
of nontariff trade barriers that affect the competitiveness of subject import markets. 
Distinguishing Between Equilibrium and Integration
A core point of this paper is the necessity of separating the concepts of equilibrium and
integration in markets analysis.  The two are not synonymous in spite of current praxis.  A good
definition of market integration is the influence of one market by another through the Walrasian
transfer of excess demand.  When two markets are integrated, supply and demand in the one
market affect the price and/or transactions volume in the other.   This definition of integration is
closely related to the concepts of tradability or contestability (Baumol 1982).  By this definition,
markets can be (imperfectly) integrated even when imperfectly competitive or inefficiently
restricted by trade barriers or collusion, whether or not physical flows occur between the markets,3
and whether or not price in one market responds (especially one-for-one) to shocks in the other.
This more practical and intuitive defintion of market integration does not equate to
competitive equilibrium.  Following the familiar logic of spatial equilibrium models, two markets, i
and j, are in long-run competitive equilibrium, meaning that marginal profits to intermarket
arbitrage equal zero, when P  ￿ -(P , P , c ) + P , with P  the price at location i in time t, and - it it jt ijt jt it
the transactions costs of spatial arbitrage, which may be a function of prices (e.g., in the case of
ad valorem or variable rate tariffs or insurance) and the exogenous costs of transport between the
two locations at time t, c . The equilibrium condition binds with equality when trade occurs.  But ijt
when trade does not occur, the constraint may be slack so there may be no correlation among
market prices in spite of the existence of competitive equilibrium.   When two markets are both
1
integrated and in long-run competitive equilibrium, they may be classified as “perfectly
integrated,” the special case on which the existing market integration literature focuses, as shown
by Goldberg and Knetter’s (1997) recent review.  Tests of the law of one price (LOP), for
example, are a test of the perfect integration hypothesis, not a test of (perhaps imperfect)
integration or of (perhaps segmented) competitive equilibrium.
Two observations are important at this juncture.  First, the above relation is a static
equilibrium condition but market relationships are inherently time-varying.  If the two markets are
not on perfectly synchronized cycles, for example, trade flow reversals will be the norm, with -
positive in some periods, negative in others.  And trade is commonly discontinuous when
transactions costs get large, so the equilibrium relation will bind with equality in some periods and
be slack in others.  Moreover, since prices and transactions costs are time series data, one must
worry about the stationarity of each series before engaging in statistical inference.  The same4
phenomena that give rise to nonstationary patterns in price series – permanent technology or
demand shocks, or the introduction or termination of taxes or regulatory controls by governments
– may also render transfer cost series nonstationary.  For these reasons, market relationships
commonly defy linear representation of time series data presumed stationary, as the next section
emphasizes.  
Second, existing markets analysis methods rely entirely on the price and transactions cost
data reflected in the spatial equilibrium condition (Barrett 1996, Goldberg and Knetter 1997).  If
arbitrageurs are profit-maximizers, trade flow data convey useful information –  traders’ revealed
preferences – about the perceived profitability of intermarket arbitrage.  Such arbitrage inherently
renders markets integrated although it does not ensure long-run competitive equilibrium.  For
example, if traders believe there are first mover advantages (quasi-option value to waiting), they
might (not) undertake arbitrage despite negative (positive) current period returns.  If markets are
imperfectly competitive, whether due to coordination between firms or market restrictions
emplaced by government, profits may persist. 
These basic insights suggest a need to disentangle analysis of physical market integration
from that of long-run competitive equilibrium between markets.  Existing markets analysis
methods fail to do this because they generally employ only price data, sometimes accompanied by
cost information.  Conventional approaches to testing for spatial market integration rely heavily
(often entirely) on measuring the comovement of prices in different markets.  However, prices in
two non-integrated locations may respond similarly to exogenous covariates, such as inflation or
climatic conditions.  The existence of price comovement between spatial markets is thus not a
sufficient condition for deducing either integration or equilibrium among the examined markets. 5
Nor does the absence of strong comovement in regional price series imply inefficient market
segmentation.  It may be socially optimal for trade to be episodic rather than continuous, a case of
segmentation in equilibrium.  Or it may be that transactions costs are more volatile than the
underlying price series, as in the case of trade flow reversals.  
Most extant methods of markets analysis – bivariate correlation coefficients, Granger
causality tests, Ravallion’s method and other error correction models, cointegration testing – fall
prey to several flawed assumptions (Barrett 1996, Li 1997, McNew and Fackler 1997, Fackler
and Goodwin forthcoming). They assume (i) no common trends (e.g., inflation, population
growth, production seasonality, a common third trading partner) within price series that may give
rise to spurious correlation, (ii) strictly additive and stationary transactions costs (i.e., -(P , P , c ) it jt ijt
reduces to -(c )), or (iii) continuous and unidirectional trade.   For example, discontinuous trade ijt
between distinct markets in the face of stochastic intermediation costs renders equilibrium
intermarket price relationships piecewise linear, causing bias and inconsistency in the linear
methods prevailing in the literature (McNew 1996).  Moreover, none of the existing methods
make use of data on trade flows, so they are inherently unable to distinguish competitive
equilibrium from integration among distinct markets.  By Barrett’s (1996) taxonomy, markets
analysis remains stuck in level I and level II methods, having not yet moved to level III methods
integrating price, transfer cost, and trade flow data.
2
The method we introduce builds on a recent literature that exploits both price and
transactions cost data in the analysis of markets.  Switching regimes models, notably Baulch’s
(1997) parity bounds model (PBM), compare observed intermarket price differentials against
observed costs of intermarket transport, thereby estimating the probability that markets are in6
competitive equilibrium (Spiller and Huang 1986, Sexton, Kling, and Carman 1991, Baulch
1997).   This approach hurdles the problems of discontinuous trade, and time-varying and
potentially nonstationary transactions costs that bedevil pure price analysis methods.  But it still
conflates the concepts of equilibrium and integration.  Price differentials less than transfer costs
are identified as “integration” even when there is no flow of product and no transmission of price
shocks between the two markets.  Conversely, markets are classified as “segmented” whenever
price differentials exceed transfer costs, regardless of whether there are observed trade flows. 
PBM and related switching regimes models that do not exploit trade flows data really study only
equilibrium conditions, not integration as we think it best defined: the Walrasian transfer of excess
demand.
While the switching regimes approach makes important advances on pure price analysis
techniques, there nonetheless remains significant room for improvement.  Since we can never
observe all possible transactions costs involved in trade (e.g., subjective risk premia, discount
rates, quasi-option values), trade flow information can offer indirect evidence of the effects of
unobservable or omitted transactions costs, thereby providing fuller information with which to
analyze market relationships.  It is common, for example, to find that trade does (not) occur even
when price differentials are less than (exceed) transfer costs – defined as the observable portion of
transactions costs – implying that some unobservable effects (e.g., trade barriers, unmeasured
transactions costs, information gaps, strategic behaviors) exist and influence intermarket trade.  If
markets are imperfectly competitive, there may be positive rents associated with arbitrage in
equilibrium and if one or both markets experience shocks, arbitrage conditions may be violated
during market disequilibrium.  Contracting and transport lags also force traders to make7
commitments before final transactions prices are realized, so that in stochastic markets, ex post
market outcomes may mistakenly suggest (in)efficiency when the real issue is imperfect
information.  One should be cautious about ex post assessment of zero profit conditions that apply
to ex ante decisions.  In short, if traders are rational profit-maximizers, trade flow data convey
additional information about market integration beyond that offered by observable price and
transfer cost data.  So it makes sense to exploit such data in markets analysis.
Extending the PBM model to include trade flow data,our approach identifies six distinct
regimes and then estimates a mixture model that estimates the probability (￿) that the market i
relationship falls into each of the six feasible regimes.  Trade is either observed (odd numbered
regimes) or not (even numbered regimes).  Price differentials may equal transfer costs (regimes 1
and 2), implying binding arbitrage conditions and tradability, regardless of whether trade occurs
or not.  Or price differentials may exceed transfer costs (regimes 3 and 4), implying the existence
of positive profits to intermarket arbitrage.  Finally, when price differentials do not fully cover
transfer costs (regimes 5 and 6), trade brings negative profit to arbitrageurs. Letting P and P be
ij
the prices in locations i and j, respectively, T  be the observable transfer costs from j to i, and ji
￿￿=1, the six regimes are summarized in Table 1 and depicted graphically in Figure 1. ii
Intermarket tradability occurs whenever trade is observed or the intermarket arbitrage
condition is binding, so that traders are indifferent between trading or not.  So (￿ +￿ +￿ +￿ ) is 1235
an estimate of the frequency of intermarket tradability.  Competitive equilibrium occurs whenever
the intermarket arbitrage (zero trader profit) condition holds, i.e., with estimated frequency
(￿ +￿ +￿ ).  Two markets are thus perfectly integrated with frequency (￿ +￿ ), inefficiently 126 12
integrated with frequency (￿ +￿ ), in segmented equilibrium with frequency ￿ , and in segmented 35 68
disequilibirium (neither integrated nor in long-run competitive equilibrium) with frequency ￿ .  4
Market segmentation, the complement of intermarket tradability, occurs with frequency  (￿ +￿ ).  46
These conditions, which fall out naturally from this estimation method, describe most of the
market characteristics of interest to analysts, policymakers, and traders.
The regimes of most concern to economists are typically those not corresponding to long-
run competitive equilibrium.  In regime 3, trade occurs and appears to earn positive marginal
profits.  This implies either (1) insufficient market arbitrage, due either to formal or informal trade
barriers or to temporary disequilibria that generate rents, or (2) the existence of significant 
unobservable transactions costs that fill in the gap between the price differential and observable
transfer costs.  In regime 4, apparent positive profits go unexploited by traders.  The plausible
explanations for this observation are the same as for regime 3.  Parallel logic holds in regime 5,
where transfer costs exceed price differentials yet trade occurs despite negative estimated
marginal profits.  This is either due to temporary disequilibria (e.g., due to information and
contracting lags) or to the existence of significant unobservable transactions benefits (e.g., first
mover advantages) accruing to traders.  
These alternatives point to two different possible interpretations of the estimated regime
frequencies, ￿ .  First, if measured transfer costs accurately reflect transactions costs faced by k
traders, the equilibrium and integration interpretations offered earlier prevail.  Alternatively, under
the maintained hypothesis of constant zero profits, (i) the ratio ￿ /(￿ +￿ +￿ ) is the proportion of 4126
nontrading periods due to unobservable transactions costs and nontariff trade barriers, and (ii) the
ratio ￿ /￿  (￿ /￿ ) is an indicator that increases with the significance of unobservable transactions 43 56























































































































equilibrium.  Rather, a zero-profit equilibrium is assumed and one is trying to estimate a measure
of the impact of unobservable costs and benefits of intermarket arbitrage.  We favor the former
interpretation but recognize there may be circumstances under which the latter may be appropriate
and of interest.
Under the approach we introduce, the observed distribution of prices is understood as a
mixture of observations drawn from different distributional regimes.   We have only partial
information as to the particular regime from which a given observation is drawn, just the binary
observation of trade or no trade.  So we estimate a mixture model, maximizing the likelihood
associated with regime frequencies found in sample, conditional on knowing whether trade occurs
or not and the distribution assumption made about the errors associated with each regime.  Since
the categorical information regarding trade is known, ours is a partially-exogenous switching
regimes model. We assume all regimes are subject to iid normal sampling and measurement error,
v, with zero mean and variance ) .  Regimes 3-6 also include a one-sided error, u, that is tv  t
2
independent of v and is iid half-normal with variance ) .  The half-normal error is added to tu  
2
(subtracted from) T  + v for regimes 3 and 4 (5 and 6).  Using the density of the sum of a normal ji t
random variable and a truncated normal random variable (Weinstein 1964), the distribution
functions for the observations in each regime are:
(1)
(2)
(3){} LA fff A fff t tt ttt
t
T
=⋅+ ++ − ⋅++















where T and Y are intermarket transfer costs and price differentials, respectively, at time t, 1 is tt
the standard normal density function and 0 is the standard normal cumulative distribution
function.  The likelihood of observing the sample price, transfer cost, and trade data can therefore
be written:
(4)
where A is a dummy variable for the occurrence of trade: A=1 if trade is observed and A=0
otherwise.  The probabilities of each regime and the variances )  and )  can be estimated by
22
uv
maximizing the logarithm of equation (4), subject to the constraints that ￿ ￿0 ~k, and ￿ ￿ =1.   kk k
3
Baulch’s (1997) PBM is a special case of our model that applies when there is no variation in
trading status (i.e., A=1 all periods or A=0 all periods), in which case the only available
information comes from price and transfer cost data.  
Intermarket transfer costs, T, commonly depend on the direction of trade since tariffs vary t
across countries and backhaul freight rates are commonly lower on some routes than are standard
freight rates going the opposite direction.  Asymmetric transfer costs implies one must estimate
direction-specific regime probabilities, i.e., one vector ￿ ￿  related to product moving from market i
ij
to market j and a second vector, ￿ ￿ , related to movements in the opposite direction.  In general,
ji
￿ ￿ -￿ ￿ g0, meaning there will not be a unique probability vector describing integration and
ij ji
equilibrium between two distinct markets since direction-specific regime probabilities may differ. 
This is not a problem for measures of tradability, which is inherently a unidirectional concept.  A
product is tradable between two markets when it can or does flow from either one to the other. 11
Bidirectional tradability is unnecessary for there to be transmission of Walrasian excess demand
between markets.  By contrast, equilibrium is an omnidirectional concept, in which the spatial
equilibrium conditions should prevail in both directions (e.g., a segmented equilibrium one
direction, and perfect integration the other).  When only one of the two markets employs nontariff
barriers to trade, equilibrium may hold in only one of two directions.  By these criteria, we use the
maximal direction-specific values of intermarket tradability and perfect integration in describing
those market conditions between two (prospective) trading partners.   By contrast, we use the
4
bounds created by the two direction-specific results in describing the frequency of spatial market
equilibrium. The width of that band is itself suggestive of the underlying efficiency of arbitrage
between the markets. In general, ￿  g￿ , so there will not be a unique probability vector kk
ij ji
describing integration and equilibrium between two distinct markets since direction-specific
regime probabilities may differ.  The two vectors offer bounds, however, on the characteristics of
interest describing the intermarket relationship, as shown in Table 2.
Our method obviously does not accommodate any dynamics in intermarket price and trade
relationships.  This has the benefit of obviating problems of exogeneity and stationarity that
bedevil time series analytical techniques applied to markets analysis (Barrett 1996, Baulch 1997,
McNew and Fackler 1997, Fackler and Goodwin forthcoming).  Like switching regimes models
(Spiller and Huang 1986, Sexton et al. 1991, Baulch 1997), one could compare leading or lagging
prices, or generate a sequence of regime frequency estimates, ￿ ￿ , where s ranges from some
ij
t+s
negative to some positive number, analogous to the cross-correlation function generalization of
binary correlation coefficients.  But our method involves inherently static estimation and is
therefore ill-suited to answering questions about the speed or extent of convergence to tradability12
or equilibrium.  The data frequency applied must be such that the estimation results can be
meaningfully interpreted.  Data at monthly frequency, such as we use in the next section’s
application, would seem appropriate since one would expect traders to respond within thirty days
to emerging profit opportunities.   
5
An Empirical Application: Pacific Rim Soybean Meal Markets
We demonstrate our method with an application to soybean meal markets around the
Pacific Rim.  Soybean meal is a reasonably homogeneous product and the world’s primary source
of vegetable oil and livestock feed.  The United States is the world’s largest producer, consumer,
and exporter of soybean meal.  Japan is the largest single importer of soybean meal, and trade in
the product is increasingly focused on the Pacific Basin. We gathered monthly price data, 1990-
96, for Japan, Taiwan, the U.S., and Canada.   The last observation month differs among the
6
countries, so there are slight differences in the number of observations used to compare among
different market pairs. We also used detailed customs data to compile monthly trade volume and
transfer cost series, including the costs of ground transport from the domestic price location,
ocean freight, insurance, loading/unloading costs, and tariffs.  We are unaware of any other study
that uses either such comprehensive time series data on the costs of commerce or trade data
combined with price and transfer cost data.  
The data show that the soybean meal markets of the Pacific Rim systematically violate
assumptions on which conventional market analysis methods depend.  Trade is commonly
bidirectional and discontinuous (Table 3).  Furthermore, transfer costs were found to be
nonstationary I(1) series in nine of the ten cases studied here, with one Canada-to-U.S. transfer13
costs stationary at the ten percent significance level.    At least one of those assumptions –
7
unidirectional, continuous trade or stationary transfer costs – is violated in every direction-specific
market pair.  Common  market analysis methods (e.g., bivariate correlation coefficients, Granger
causality, Ravallion's model, and cointegration) yield divergent results in these data because each
is impacted differently by violation of their core underlying assumptions (Li 1997).  In the lone
case where trade is continuous and transfer costs are stationary, between Canada and the United
States, all the conventional methods (i.e., bivariate correlation coefficients, Granger causality,
cointegration) suggest perfect market integration.   In all the other market pairs, transfer costs are
8
nonstationary and we consistently find only two of four methods will generate an equivalent
assessment of market performance.  Such inferential inconsistency across methods underscores
the fragility of markets analysis using existing methods based on untenable assumptions about the
nature of trade flows and transfer costs.  Trade is continuous in only two market pairs (Canada to
Japan and U.S. to Canada), so our results also generally diverge from the PBM results, which
assume continuous trade (or the continuous absence of trade).
Table 4 presents the estimation results, which demonstrate empirically several of the
conceptual points made earlier.  First, there are commonly differences according to the direction
of trade between two markets.  This is to be expected when one country consistently holds
comparative advantage over the other and so trade flows are directionally imbalanced, as in the
case of the United States and either Japan or Taiwan.  Such differences likewise emerge when
only one country in the pair employs nontariff barriers to trade, as does Japan.  
Second, the distinction between tradability and equilibrium becomes immediately apparent.
Competitive equilibrium conditions are frequently violated despite active arbitrage, as reflected in14
positive and statistically significant estimates of ￿  and ￿  on flows from both Canada and the 35
United States to Japan, from Japan and Taiwan to the United States.  Conversely, a no trade
competitive equilibrium (￿ ) often holds in one direction when one trading partner is at serious 6
comparative disadvantage to the other, as in the case of relations from either Japan or Taiwan to
the United States. 
Third, segmented disequilibrium (￿ ), in which positive expected profits to arbitrage go 4
entirely unseized, appears exceedingly rare.  Intermarket trade, although by no means constant,
responds to profit opportunities, even in the face of transfer costs and trade barriers.  The absence
of trade, however, does not mean that the product is not tradable between the two markets, as
manifest by commonplace positive and statistically significant estimates for ￿ , the estimated 2
frequency of no-trade spatial equilibrium in which the arbitrage constraint is binding.  Even when
trade is absent, Pacific soybean meal markets appear contestable and therefore tradable.
Table 5 presents probability estimates for the intermarket conditions defined in Table 2. 
Soybean meal is effectively always tradable between these markets.  Only flows from Japan to
Canada and the U.S. and from Taiwan to the U.S. were tradable with less than 97 percent
frequency, and their counterpart frequency estimates in the opposite direction were always at least
99 percent.   Likewise, competitive market equilibrium prevails 90 percent or more of the time
among all market pairs not including Japan.  Trade barriers and strategic behavior appear to result
in substantial inefficiency in trading relations with Japan, where  positive marginal rents to
soybean meal importing (￿ >0) occur far more frequently than in any other market.  Nonetheless, 3
trading at a loss accounts for almost three-quarters of all periods of market disequilbrium
(￿ /(￿ +￿ +￿ )).  Constant perfect market integration (￿ +￿ =1) holds for three direction-specific 5345 12  15
relations (Canada to U.S., Canada to Taiwan, and U.S. to Taiwan), reflecting the efficiency and
tradability of these markets, conditions not reflected in the results of conventional market
integration testing methods that rest upon assumptions that do not hold in practice.
Conclusion
This paper presents an attempt to bridge price-based and quantity-based approaches to the
study of market integration by introducing a new methodology using maximum likelihood
estimation of a mixture distribution model incorporating price, transfer cost, and trade flow data. 
We show how this new method permits construction of intuitive and useful indicators of the
frequency of intermarket tradability, competitive market equilibrium, perfect market integration (a
tradable competitive equilibrium), segmented equilibrium, and segmented disequilibrium.  In other
words, this new methods permits useful distinction between market integration, reflecting the
tradability of products between spatially distinct markets, irrespective of the existence or absence
of spatial market equilibrium, and competitive market equilibrium, in which extraordinary profits
are exhausted by competitive pressures to yield socially efficient allocations, regardless of whether
this results in physical trade flows between markets.  These two concepts are conflated in
traditional market analysis methods.  Moreover, unlike widely used price analysis techniques, this
method is well-suited to market linkages exhibiting time-varying, nonstationary or nonadditive
transfer costs and with discontinuous or bidirectional trade, as are found in the Pacific Rim
soybean meal data set used as an example.  16
Table 1. The Six Intermarket Regimes
P- P = T P- P > T P- P < T i  jj i i  jj i i  jj i
Trade ￿￿￿ 135
No trade ￿￿￿ 246
Table 2. Indicators of Intermarket Conditions
Characteristic
Intermarket tradability max(￿ +￿ +￿ +￿ , ￿ +￿ +￿ +￿ ) 12351235
ij ij ij ij ji ji ji ji
Perfect market integration max(￿ +￿ , ￿ +￿ ) 1212
ij ij ji ji
Intermarket segmentation min(￿ +￿ , ￿ +￿ )  4646
ij ij ji ji
Spatial market equilibrium [min(￿ +￿ +￿ , ￿ +￿ +￿ ), max(￿ +￿ +￿ , ￿ +￿ +￿ )] 126126 126126
ij ij ij ji ji ji ij ij ij ji ji ji
Inefficient integration [min(￿ +￿ , ￿ +￿ ),  max(￿ +￿ , ￿ +￿ )] 3535 3535
ij ij ji ji ij ij ji ji
Segmented equilibrium  [min(￿ , ￿ ),  max(￿ , ￿ , min(￿ +￿ , ￿ +￿ ))]  66 66 4646
ij ji ij ji ij ij ji ji
Segmented disequilibrium [min(￿ , ￿ ),  max(￿ , ￿ ,  min(￿ +￿ , ￿ +￿ ))] 44 44 4646
ij ji ij ji ij ij ji ji
Table 3. Soybean Meal Trade Frequencies, 1990-96 
From\To U.S. Canada Japan Taiwan
U.S. - 100% 81.5% 54.3%
Canada 88.9% - 100% 20.2%
Japan 38.3% 78.6% - NA
Taiwan 12.3% 58.3% NA -
Note: The frequency of bidirectional trade in soybean meal between the United States and Taiwan
(Japan) is 7.4% (30.8%). The frequency of bidirectional trade in soybean meal between Canada and
Taiwan is 10.7%.17
Table 4.  FIPBM Testing Results for Pacific Rim Soybean Meal Markets
Countries Trade No Trade
From To ￿￿￿￿￿￿)) 135246uv
¶  US ￿ CA 0.92* 0.01 0.07* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.195 0.018
(0.06) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
  CA ￿ US 0.88* 0.00 0.00 0.12* 0.00 0.00 0.324 0.077
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00)
  TW ￿ CA 0.53* 0.02 0.01 0.41* 0.02 0.01 0.12 E-5 0.359
(0.07) (0.03) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02)
  CA ￿ TW 0.22* 0.00 0.00 0.78* 0.00 0.00 0.368 0.207
(0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00)
¶  CA ￿ JP 0.01 0.17 0.82* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.013 0.088
(0.00) (0.35) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
  JP ￿ CA 0.77* 0.01* 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.19* 1.415 0.475
(0.05) (0.00) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.00)
  US ￿ JP 0.14 0.33* 0.34* 0.18* 0.01 0.00 0.44 E-6 0.065
(0.31) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.01) (0.00)
  JP ￿ US 0.01 0.01 0.39* 0.01* 0.01 0.57* 0.30 E-5 0.513
(0.01) (0.01) (0.10) (0.03) (0.13) (0.13)
  US ￿ TW 0.52* 0.00 0.00 0.48* 0.00 0.00 0.184 0.030
(0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00)
  TW ￿ US 0.01* 0.01 0.09* 0.01* 0.01 0.87* 6.855 0.386
(0.00) (0.02) (0.03) (0.00) (0.02) (0.03)
¶ results consistent with PBM since trade is continuous.
Standard errors (computed using Gallant-Holly method) are in parentheses.
* statistically significantly different from zero at the 95% confidence level.
Rows may not sum to one due to rounding error.
Table 5.  Probability Estimates of Intermarket Conditions
Perfect Market Intermarket Segmented Market
Integration Tradability Disequilibrium Equilibrium
Market Pair ￿ +￿￿ +￿ +￿ +￿￿ ￿ +￿ +￿ 12 1235 4 126
JP - CA 0.78 1.00 0.00 [0.01, 0.97]
TW - CA 1.00 1.00 0.00 [0.95, 1.00]
US - CA 1.00 1.00 0.00 [0.92, 1.00]
JP - US 0.32 0.99 0.01 [0.32, 0.59]
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Figure 1: A Stylilzed Depiction of the Relationships Between Price Differentials, Transfer
Costs, and Trade Flows19
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1. Goldberg and Knetter (1997: 1245), reflecting the bulk of the literature, claim that “[a]ny
perfectly competitive market is characterized by the condition that price equals marginal cost. 
Therefore a perfectly competitive market must be integrated.”  The claim in the second sentence
relies on the assumption of an interior solution, i.e., continuous tradability. When corner solutions
occur – as manifest by no trade – segmented equilibria are possible. Since trade can also occur
without perfect competition – as in the case of binding quotas – equilibrium is neither necessary
nor sufficient for integration, nor vice versa. 
2. Barrett’s (1996) hierarchical taxonomy labels as “level I” methods those approaches that use
only price data for inference about market conditions.  Level II methods combine price and
transactions cost data, the combination of which permits more robust inference about market
relationships.  Level III methods combine price, transactions cost and trade flows data and allow
the greatest analytical flexibility. 
3. Some readers will notice that this likelihood function, like that of other stochastic switching
regression models, may suffer convergence problems because the gradients approach singularity
at the edge of the parameter space.  In practice, the edge of parameter space is encountered with
some frequency.  This manifests itself readily in unusually high t-statistics since )  goes to zero as ￿i
￿ goes to either boundary (zero or one).  We find this most commonly occurs in the case of ￿ , i  6
segmented equilibrium.
4. Equivalently, the minima are the most appropriate estimates for market segmentation between a
pair of markets (￿ +￿ ).  46
5.Another way to view the tradeoff is between risk of aggregation bias arising from the use of
lower frequency data, versus risk of specification bias arising from (at least piecewise) linear
approximation of quite nonlinear relationships in higher frequency data.  The key point is there
exists no unambiguously preferable method of markets analysis.  The one we introduce here
simply permits a variety of intuitive interpretations previously unavailable.
6. Details on all data sources and their comparability are reported in Barrett et al. (1997).  The
data are available from the authors by request.
7. All the transfer cost series are nonadditive in that there is some multiplicative component
attributable to ad valorem tariffs or graduated insurance or freight schedules.  ADF test results
available from the authors by request.
8. Details of all the test results are reported in Li (1997).
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